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Performing the City-Region: Imagineering, Devolution and the 
Search for Legitimacy 
Abstract 
This paper provides new conceptual and empirical insights in to the role city-regions play as part 
of a geopolitical strategy deployed by the nation state to enact its own interests, in conversation 
with local considerations. Emphasis falls on the performative roles of economic models and 
spatial-economic imaginaries in consolidating and legitimising region-building efforts and the 
strategies and tactics employed by advocates to gain credibility and traction for their chosen 
imaginaries. We focus on the Sheffield City Region (SCR) and Doncaster within it (South 
Yorkshire, England) drawing on 56 in-depth interviews with local policymakers, civic institutions 
and private sector stakeholders conducted between 2015 and 2018. In doing so, we identify three 
overlapping phases in the building of the SCR: a period of initial case-making to build 
momentum behind the SCR imaginary; a second of concerted challenge from alternative 
imaginaries; and a third where the SCR was co-constituted alongside the dominant alternative 
One Yorkshire imaginary. Our work suggests that the city-region imaginary has gained traction 
and sustained momentum as national interests have closed down local resistance to the SCR. 
This has momentarily locked local authorities into a preferred model of city-regional devolution 
but in playing its hand, central government has exposed city-region building as a precarious fix 
where alternative imaginaries simply constitute a deferred problem for central government 
going forward.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Introduction 
In the UK, city-regions have emerged as the preferred scalar fix in a local state framework aimed 
at bolstering the economic productivity and competitiveness of underperforming provincial cities 
while sustaining the economic fortunes of strategically dominant places such as London (Deas, 
2014; Etherington and Jones, 2009: 248). Underpinning this framework is the belief that 
unlocking latent potential for subnational economic growth is dependent on the performance of 
larger and larger urban agglomerations supported through the targeting of public and private 
sector resources and investment towards already dynamic local economies (Haughton et al., 
2014, 2016). However, rather than seeing the current city-centric perspective in spatial 
policymaking as part of a process of hollowing out of the nation state, we follow Jonas and 
Moisio (2018) in seeing it as a geopolitical strategy actively deployed by the nation state to serve 
its own interests, in conversation with local considerations. In doing so, our contribution is to 
bring Jonas and Moisios framework into dialogue with recent work on the performative role of 
economic models and spatial-economic imaginaries in consolidating and legitimising region-
building efforts (Haughton et al., 2016; Hincks et al., 2017). Through this perspective, we 
emphasise how specific imaginaries gain credibility and traction through the claim-making of 
actors that involves justifying, lobbying and bolstering support for a dominant vision while 
attempting to close down or limit the influence of alternatives (Haughton et al., 2013).  
This focus offers scope for examining empirically the extent to which spatial-economic 
imaginaries open-up discussions of alternative spatial futures, especially where disruptive 
possibilities are pitted against the city-regional imaginary and its associated policy architecture 
that has been defined and shaped through the interests of the nation state. Using a nested case 
study approach, our empirical lens falls on the Sheffield City Region (SCR) and the town of 
Doncaster  located in the SCR  as a means of providing a situated account of local responses 
to new city-regional policy and institutional innovations introduced in England from 2010. The 
specific emphasis on Doncaster within the SCR is deliberate for two reasons. First, it allows for 
an appreciation of a marginalised partner perspective in English devolution debates typically 
dominated by big city narratives (Beel et al., 2016; Harrison, 2006). Second, the SCR is located 
in the historic county of Yorkshire, which has seen the emergence of a counter-devolution 
movement towards a One Yorkshire vision of which Doncaster has been a vocal advocate. As 
the story in this paper unfolds, so it will become clear how Doncaster and the SCR diverge in 
their views on devolution, visions of the future, and ambitions to challenge or sustain the 
currently dominant city-regional fix. This is against the context of a turbulent period of national-
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local relations where Brexit is shaping local strategies of region-building and intensifying already 
fractured local opinions over devolution and established territorial arrangements. i 
Conceptualising city-region-building: geopolitical processes, performed imaginaries and 
the search for legitimacy 
The starting point for our framework is to recognise city-region-building as part of a geopolitical 
strategy deployed by the nation state in response to territorial-political dilemmas within and 
beyond its national borders (Jonas and Moisio, 2018: 366). Following Jonas and Moisio (2018: 
358), three principles underpin the framework. The first is to recognise the territorialising 
processes that connect city-regionalism with the political, cultural and economic visions of the 
nation state. The second is in unravelling the material arrangements and architectures that 
underpin the alignment of national and city-regional interests. The third involves considering the 
political and economic actors  alongside their capacity to act  who formulate and enact 
political strategies and experiments through which national and city-regional interests conjoin. 
From our perspective, understanding the alignment of national and city-regional interests 
involves treating city-regionalism as a contested product of discourses (talk), territorial 
relationships (territory) and technologies (both material and of power) (Addie and Keil, 2015: 
409) involving a diverse set of territorial-political processes through which national state 
interests are orchestrated (Jonas and Moisio, 2018: 366). As new modes of governance and 
political engagement are made and re-made around city-regions, these inevitably attract powers 
away from the nation state, but only insofar as the strategic and selective provision of social and 
physical infrastructure to city-regions forms part of the states management of its own self-
interests (Jonas, 2013: 288-289).  
In the UK, it was around 2004 that political appetite for city-regional governance intensified, 
especially in England, under a Labour-led Government (see Harrison, 2012). From 2010, further 
innovations in subnational governance and policy were introduced under Conservative-led 
Governments in part as a response to the question of Scottish devolution and later independence 
that helped support calls for further decentralisation to English cities (Jonas and Moisio, 2018: 
359). These later interventions at the city-regional scale included the formation of private sector-
led Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) designed to bolster economic growth and City Deals 
aimed at facilitating local involvement in financial planning, regeneration, transport and labour 
market interventions (HM Government, 2011). More recently, a suite of Combined Authorities 
(ten by April 2020)  with provision for metro mayors  have been introduced alongside a 
series of asymmetric devolution deals that pool local government resources and 
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responsibilities and assume from central government a range of delegated transport, economic 
development and regeneration functions (Deas, 2014: 2286).  
Underpinning the appetite for city-regions in England has been the (questionable) intellectual 
argument that as functional economic geographies, city-regions represent an ideal scale for 
drawing-down the benefits of agglomeration in an effort to spatially rebalance internal economic 
productivity while improving the competitiveness of cities in relation to their international 
counterparts (HM Treasury, 2006: 1). Focusing on questions of internal (re-)distribution, 
Harrison (2014: 2318) notes how the English economy has long-been characterised by persistent 
and deepening gaps in growth rates between regions, reflected in the overheating of London and 
the South East and the underperformance of the economies of the North of England. With 
populations in Englands major urban centres also increasing during the latter half of the 
twentieth-century (Harrison, 2014), pressure on land, housing, transport, environmental 
resources and social infrastructure has intensified, raising questions over the redistributive 
potential of agglomeration (Haughton et al., 2014). At the same time, previous attempts to 
devolve resources and responsibilities to sub-national institutions in England ii  as part of 
ongoing efforts to modernise local government, tackle electoral apathy, and address concerns 
over the weakening of local democratic accountability and transparency (Newman, 2014)  
stalled, leaving England highly centralised, especially compared to Scotland and Wales.  
Against this backdrop, in 2014 the then Chancellor George Osborne launched the Northern 
Powerhouse, an ill-defined spatial construct iii but one mooted to be about improving 
productivity across northern England through urban agglomeration and improved connectivity 
around the economies of major city-regions (Hincks et al., 2017). In the UK, city-regions 
contribute 26% of the UKs economic output and 20% of its trade and exports, but continue to 
lag behind international counterparts in productivity terms (Core Cities, 2018). As a pan-
Northern coalition of city-regions, the Northern Powerhouse was earmarked to drive the 
international competiveness of the North in areas encompassing advanced manufacturing, 
energy, health innovation and digital iv but only insofar that this did not compromise Londons 
competitiveness as a global city within the international circulation of capital (Haughton et al., 
2016). Identifying something of an opportunity to reposition the UKs second-tier city-regions in 
a post-Brexit landscape, the Core Cities Group  a lobby consisting of Bristol, Birmingham, 
Leeds, Newcastle, Liverpool, Manchester, Nottingham and Sheffield  (self-)defined the core 
city-regions as global hubs with unrealised potential (Core Cities, 2018: 9). In doing so, they 
present a vision for 2030 where the core city-regions are trusted with greater freedoms and 
control; have seen investment in infrastructure  including High Speed 2v  extended (see also 
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HM Government, 2017); are tackling long-standing skills-gaps; and are benefiting from increased 
levels of international investment (Core Cities, 2018). While clearly aspirational, it is notable how 
the lobby of the Core Cities Group is working to draw down, rather than by-pass, state 
LQIUDVWUXFWXUDODQGÀVFDOFDSDFLWLHV in an effort to reposition city-regions (inter-)nationally after 
Brexit.  
Together these processes and tactics around deepening the city-regional agenda in England have 
created a complex and uneven landscape of (partially) decentralised powers and resources in 
which the nation state has employed strategies of spatial and temporal selectiveness as to where 
and when it engages in city-region deal-making. In a speech delivered at the launch of the second 
wave of city-deals in 2012, the former Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Greg Clark, pointed to 
the need to unlock growth in the right places  read cities  beyond what he called the abstract, 
national levelvi (see HM Government, 2011). For some the current emphasis on deal-making is a 
positive innovation, promoting growth that is locally sensitive and potentially transformative 
(Centre for Cities, 2013). For others, the asymmetric and experimental nature of English city-
regional deal-making is problematic in deepening territorial inequalities and pitting places against 
one another (Haughton et al., 2014, 2016; OBrien and Pike, 2019). That devolution deals were 
promoted during a period of austerity has also been met with pointed criticism for exposing 
chosen localities to increased financial risk at a time of fiscal retrenchment (Lowndes and 
Gardner, 2016) and for deepening the neoliberal tendencies of the state towards a dramatic 
redistribution of wealth and income in favour of the rich (Callinicos, 2012: 67). Set against these 
competing viewpoints, what is clear is that city-region deal-making in England represents a 
radical shift in central-local relations where nationally-ratified deals have ensured city-regional 
actors continue to operate within established rules of the game where city-regions and their 
policy architectures constitute the only game in town (Beel et al., 2016).   
Against this context, we recognise that the territorialising processes and material arrangements 
that  help align national and city-regional interests (Jonas and Moisio, 2018: 358) are conditioned 
by  if not reducible to  the overall constraints imposed by the discipline of a neoliberal 
policy environment where contestations about radically different futures often linger below 
the surface (Addie and Keil, 2015: 409). That the neoliberal policy environment exists alongside 
other state and social formations ensures contextualised hybrids of actually existing 
neoliberalism that counter pure neoliberal ideologies in which natural markets are assumed to 
exist out there and operate through immutable laws no matter where they are unleashed 
(Peck et al., 2009: 49). For Karl Polanyi (1944), economies were always embedded in society, not 
constituted as some external arena separate from societal rules and institutional arrangements 
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(Block and Somers, 2014). Consequently, for Polanyi, pure markets or states never existed, for 
both markets and states are constituted through cultural, social, institutional and political 
relations and situated as dynamic and variegated hybrids of multiple modes of coordination, 
resources, power and interventions involving competition, exchange, redistribution and 
reciprocity (Haughton et al., 2016: 357).  
For Haughton et al. (2016), the currently pervasive agglomeration-centrism of city-region policy 
in the UK has been underpinned by political and policy actors producing and consuming de-
contextualised readings of economic theory based on abstract laws. The effect has been to 
smooth away the complexity of actually existing economies not least given the evidence that 
economic growth rates are higher in many of the smaller cities of the UK and elsewhere in 
Europe (Haughton et al., 2016: 356). In situated economies, abstract laws are deposed as actors 
engage in the realpolitik acts needed to balance modes of competition, growth, cooperation and 
redistribution (Jones and MacLeod, 2004). For Haughton et al. (2016), the exuberance with 
which the principles of agglomeration have been consumed within policy circles in the UK and 
elsewhere is testament to the performative work of economic models (Callon, 1998)  alongside 
professional economists and think tanks  in legitimising certain forms of knowledge while 
circumventing others (Christophers, 2014; Mackenzie, 2006). How economic devices are defined 
shapes interpretations of how economies and markets work: competing conceptions of both can 
be mobilised selectively to legitimise discrete forms of statecraft and material interventions that 
serve specific interests at the expense of others (Haughton et al., 2016; Newman, 2014; Peck et 
al., 2009).  
While acknowledging that city-regions are neither normative ideational constructs nor a set of 
predictable practices (Addie and Keil, 2015: 409), we are mindful here of the performative roles 
played by economic and spatial imaginaries in influencing public and political opinion about 
how future economic growth can best be nurtured and its benefits distributed (Haughton et al., 
2016: 358). Here spatial and economic imaginaries constitute selective readings of highly 
complex realities  incorporating certain semeiotic and extra-semiotic characteristics at the 
expense of others  that allow individual actors or groups to make sense of the world around 
them (Jessop, 2012). This selectivity helps to define the shared logic underpinning an imaginary 
and provides anchor points around which buy-in to a particular worldview is mobilised. The 
imprecision and flexibility of spatial imaginaries enables policymakers to construct and lobby for 
particular readings of a situation (Hincks et al., 2017: 645) that leads to a distribution of features, 
functions and meanings that define what is appropriate and possible in any given context (see 
Jones and Jessop, 2010). 
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The effect is to create a market for ideas in which particular ways of seeing the world (e.g. pro-
agglomeration or pro-inclusive-growth) are supported or challenged by actors working towards 
or against a common agenda, and in doing so mobilising particular devices (e.g. economic 
models, policy documents, maps) to support their own viewpoints (Muniesa et al., 2007). 
Research has shown that for a particular imaginary to gain traction and potentially assume 
hegemonic status  however temporary or fleeting that might be (Jessop, 2012)  it needs a clear 
and convincing logic; to resonate at multiple sites and scales; and to outcompete existing and 
newly articulated imaginaries (Hincks et al., 2017). The consequence of this search for legitimacy 
is a process of creation and destruction in which contemporary territorial configurations are 
contingent on complex legacies of past region-building efforts that cannot be ignored or 
considered obsolete and dismissed as merely of historical interest (Hincks et al., 2017: 646). 
The implication here is that the consideration of what is appropriate or possible is historically 
as well as socially and culturally contingent (Jones and Jessop, 2010).  
To understand why certain imaginaries gain traction over others, we draw here on insights from 
work on soft spaces of planning  the informal, in-between spaces of governance that exist 
beyond defined territorial boundaries, such as those of local government (Haughton et al.., 
2010). As Haughton et al. (2013) demonstrate, certain soft spaces, superficially at least, allow for 
the involvement of a diversity of actors in the governance of spatial development and for 
particular demands to be voiced openly. Yet it has been shown that involvement in these spaces 
is typically contingent on actor interests aligning with the dominant (market) orientation of 
hegemonic spatial development agendas at the expense of alternatives (Haughton et al., 2013). 
Against this background then, while different city-regions will be constituted by multiple and 
competing visions (Hincks et al., 2017), in each context a dominant imaginary will have worked 
to close down or limit the scope for other possibilities to gain sufficient traction to assume 
hegemonic status (Haughton et al., 2013: 222). Here the extent to which alternative spatial 
imaginaries are able to open-up discussions of alternative spatial futures is worthy of further 
investigation, especially where disruptive possibilities are pitted against the established city-
regional imaginary and its associated logics.  
Building the Sheffield City Region 
In the following section, we employ this framework in the context of the Sheffield City Region 
(SCR) and Doncaster within it (Figure 1a). We draw on 56 in-depth interviews, conducted 
between 2015 and 2018, with actors holding strategic roles in the SCR Combined Authority, the 
SCR Local Enterprise Partnership, Chambers of Commerce, local authorities, local businesses 
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and local civic organisations. While the majority of interviews were conducted in Doncaster, 
interviewees were also recruited from the broader SCR area to provide different viewpoints on 
intra-city-regional dynamics and relationships. In doing so, we explore how advocates promote 
city-regionalism on behalf of the state and how other actors mobilise to challenge the hegemony 
of city-regionalism. We consider the diverse logics and tactics employed by different actors to 
build momentum and secure legitimacy for their activities and chosen imaginary at the expense 
of alternatives (Hincks et al., 2017; Jonas and Moisio, 2018) over the course of three overlapping 
phases in building the SCR.  
 C  R  
The historic development of the City of Sheffield and South Yorkshire more broadly owes much 
to the availability of the waterpower and charcoal that came to underpin the growth of steel and 
coal production in the area during the 19th century. With the onset of economic restructuring and 
the rollout of market-orientated local economic development agendas from the late-1970s, coal 
and steel production went into decline across South Yorkshire. Unemployment in Sheffield rose 
from 4% in 1978 to 16% in 1984 (Lane et al., 2016) while pockets of unemployment hit more 
than 40% in parts of Doncaster (Thorleifsson, 2016). At the same time, the closure of mines, 
union militancy, and the leadership, from within Sheffield, of two miners strikes in the 1980svii, 
strained local labour relations and fostered deep-hostilities between South Yorkshire and central 
government (Winkler, 2007).  
As the neoliberal policies of Thatchers Conservative Government were rolled-out nationally, 
Sheffield City Council  backed by South Yorkshire County Council  took a radical approach 
in seeking strong local government intervention in a city that had considered itself 
abandoned by the private sector (Winkler, 2007: 14). In pitting its own government-led 
approach against the states market-orientated ideology, Sheffield failed to benefit fully from 
major government funding for regeneration and local economic development throughout much 
of the 1980s. In plotting a path to economic recovery, Sheffields leaders subsequently accepted 
government terms in 1988 on the creation of a new Urban Development Corporation to help 
attract inward investment, especially into disadvantaged areas of the city.  
By the early 1990s, South Yorkshire was drawing down European Objective Two funding and 
later, in 1999, became eligible for European Objective One funds (Winkler, 2007). At the same 
time, a raft of new area-based initiatives, rolled-out by the New Labour Government, provided 
additional sources of funding for Sheffield and the wider city-region. Yet Doncaster continued to 
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struggle into the 2000s as economic decline accelerated, labour market insecurity persisted, and 
relative deprivation deepened (Thorleifsson, 2016).  
It was against this backdrop that the SCR was formally established in 2004 as one of eight city-
regions defined under New Labours Northern Way agenda, a partnership between the then 
three regional development agencies in the North of England that was intended to strengthen 
the northern economy (ODPM, 2004). However, it was not until the demise of Yorkshire 
Forwardviii in 2012 that the Sheffield city-region assumed prominence in local political and policy 
debates following the election in 2010 of a new Conservative-led Coalition government with an 
anti-regional and new localist agenda (Shaw and Tewdwr-Jones, 2016). To support the SCR, 
the Sheffield City Region Local Enterprise Partnership (SCRLEP) and the Sheffield City Region 
Combined Authority (SCRCA) were established in 2010 and 2014 respectively. The SCRLEP is 
based on a travel-to-work geography that maps onto nine local authorities across South 
Yorkshire, North Derbyshire and North Nottinghamshire. The SCRCA covers this same 
geography, although constituent membership is restricted to the local authorities of Sheffield, 
Doncaster, Rotherham and Barnsley in the metropolitan county of South Yorkshire (Figures 1b 
and d).  
For Doncaster, there was pragmatic support initially for the SCR as a means of accessing 
resources (Local Officer A) following decades of industrial decline, under-investment, high 
unemployment and two episodes of central government intervention between 2000-2002 and 
2010-2014 ix. With the support of Doncaster, the SCR City Deal and Growth Deal were agreed in 
2012 and 2014 respectively. These were followed in 2015 by the agreement of a more extensive 
deal led by the Combined Authority after which the SCR became the second city-region after 
Greater Manchester to reach a devolution agreement with central government. Approved in 
principle, the deal was set to give the SCRCA increased responsibility over strategic planning and 
transport budgets and an additional £30 million a year over 30 years to invest in growth and 
skills (Etherington and Jones, 2018). As a condition of the deal, the SCRCA agreed to elect a 
metro mayor by May 2017. However, for reasons outlined below, this election took place in May 
2018, much later than planned, when the former Labour politician, Dan Jarvis, was elected on a 
platform of mutualism and co-operative principles (Jarvis, 2018) leading to the establishment of 
a Co-operative Advisory Panel and a Youth Combined Authorityx.  
Yet, the mutualism and co-operative principles championed by the mayor and his team faced a 
battle to be heard over the din of the agglomeration and globalising competitiveness logics that 
underpin the current spatial and economic imaginaries of the SCR (SCR, 2014a). The SCR 
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Growth Deal makes the case  using economic projections developed by Oxford Economics  
that the SCR is an area of national economic significance and a global brand, contributing 
over £25.7bn for the UK economy and having the potential to deliver an extra 68,000 
jobs and GVA of over £29.7bn by 2022 (SCR, 2014a). The principles of agglomeration and 
competitive growth are writ large in the SCR as it seeks to maximise the agglomeration 
benefits of high-speed rail (SCR, 2014b: 48) and transition the economic base dominated by 
coal and steel to a competitive 21st century, high value manufacturing, knowledge and service-
led, economy (SCR, 2014b: 20). At the same time that the Devo Sheffield deal was agreed, 
George Osborne, the then Chancellor, was in the early stages of mobilising support for the 
Northern Powerhouse project by virtue of promoting, among other initiatives, HS2xi (Figure 1c). 
The SCRs ambition  and the City of Sheffields especially  to ensure HS2 passed through the 
city(-region) resulted in a convenient alignment of central government interests with those of the 
city(-region). In reflecting on the Devo Sheffield agreement, George Osborne commented 
that: 
Manchester is not a one-off  far from it. In becoming the second great northern city to 
sign up to managing its own affairs with this ambitious agreement, Sheffield City Region 
is playing a vital part in helping to build the Northern Powerhouse (Osborne, 2015, emphasis 
addedxii). 
Against this backdrop, a number of interviewees embraced Doncasters role in the SCR as part 
of a nationally championed devolution model, with one interviewee in Doncaster claiming 
our role is to do our part to release that growth and that potential so that Sheffield 
City Region can prosperso were not seeing ourselvesas just Doncaster, butas part 
of a city region (Local Officer B). 
Many interviewees also regarded coordinated city-regional action as a necessary requirement for 
gaining favour with central government, the benefits of which had been witnessed in Greater 
Manchester. This was underpinned by a sense that a pragmatic and tactical focus was needed to 
push through a deal for the SCR as the only platform government will speak to (Local Officer 
A) in order to avoid losing out to competitor cities.  
Here a number of interviewees reflected on the alignment of central and local interests in 
establishing the SCR imaginary as a convenient one (Local Officer C) but one that was not 
without its challenges. Austerity featured prominently here with interviewee testimony pointing 
to a considerable degree of early discontent with central governments radical devolution 
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approach (Osborne, 2015). Questions were raised over what new powers and resources were 
actually gained through devolution given that between 2010 and 2014, the SCR budget was cut 
by £1109 million set against the £900 million that was being offered in 2015 through a 30-year 
devolution agreement (Etherington and Jones, 2018: 66-7).  
For these reasons, there was a prevailing sense that through cuts to welfare and local authority 
funding, the government had taken with one hand and given with the other (Local Officer C). 
This was seen to have placed considerable pressures on the most disadvantaged in the city-region 
as Devo Sheffield required the city-region to do much more with much less (Local Officer D). 
Yet for some, the deal was considered the only practical way of clawing back resources following 
a decade of austerity. As one interviewee commented, 
with austerity, where weve got less capital, weve got less reserves, weve got less 
revenue, weve got more pressures out there around, particularly social careit [Devo 
Sheffield] doesnt plug the gap [in lost funding] but we need to get the deal done to get 
back whatever we can [from central government] (Local Officer D).  
While the national interest focused on cementing the SCR as a decision-making and economic 
unit, a number of interviewees considered the SCR a temporary fix on the path to Yorkshire-
wide devolution, with one interviewee capturing the sentiment of others when noting that 
we've learnt that doing the deal is not the end of the journey. It's a passport to the 
next phase of negotiation (SCRCA Officer A). 
 C  R  
The fate of the SCR began to change in late-2015 with the onset of a major dispute over the 
location of the SCR HS2 station. The original plan proposed by central government was to 
locate the station at the Meadowhall retail complex (three miles northeast of Sheffield city centre, 
close to the Sheffield-Rotherham border). However, the City of Sheffield strongly opposed the 
plan and lobbied instead to locate the station in the centre of Sheffield (Figure 1a), much to the 
indignation of Doncaster and Barnsley (Burns, 2017). Then, in December 2016, there was a legal 
challenge launched over the SCRCAs geographical makeup when the High Court ruled as 
unlawful, a consultation to include Chesterfield local authority in the SCRCA (Clarke, 2017). 
These events publically exposed antagonistic relations, the perseverance of local politics and 
diverging interests within the SCR, leading to a delay in the signing of the devolution deal and the 
election of a SCR mayor in May 2017. 
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In contrast to Greater Manchester, which has long-projected an image of cohesive civic relations 
and collaborative working (Haughton et al., 2016), SCR relations were described as lacking the 
maturity and trust to overcome parochialism (Civic Organisation A) leading to publically aired 
clashes between the council leaders of South Yorkshire, with one interviewee bemoaning how 
four people's disagreement can have such a serious [potential] disadvantage to 
hundreds of thousands of other people in terms of lost finances (SCRCA Officer B).   
One of the most cited issues seeding these tensions was the city-centric focus of the new 
devolution arrangement. In the case of Doncaster, these tensions were manifest in local anxieties 
over the prospect of being made to buy into a system that could potentially make Sheffield a 
superpower while leaving Doncaster on the outskirts (Private Sector A). For a number of 
interviewees, central governments labelling of the City of Sheffield as core marked non-core 
places in the SCR as peripheral or other, creating a hierarchy that was seen to foster internal 
distrust with, as one interviewee noted, Sheffield seeming to always take the bulk of 
everything on offer (Civic Organisation B). This resonated in the way that devolution deal 
negotiations were seen to have been an exclusive dialogue between the City of Sheffield and 
Whitehall, with one interviewee commenting that Sheffield just put it [the devolution deal] 
together and asked everybody else to approve it at the very last minute (SCRCA Officer C). 
The tension between national interests that centre on pressing ahead with the SCR deal and local 
interests  viewed here mainly through the lens of Doncaster  are palpable. A notable point of 
discontent was around the assumptions of the big city model that were seen to underpin the 
economic logic of the SCR. Where the SCR Growth Deal estimated a productivity dividend of 
city-regional devolution of over £29.7bn by 2022, the City of Sheffield economic strategy notes 
how Sheffield is not fulfilling its economic potential. A prosperity gap of £1.6billion persists in 
comparison to the national average (SCC, 2019: 3). For some interviewees, being tied to a core 
city that was deemed, by its own admission, to not be punching its weight (Chamber of 
Commerce) was seen to bring little benefit to Doncasterxiii.  
While initially supporting the model of city-region devolution in the hope of securing increased 
autonomy and funding, from late-2015 local actors in Doncaster began resisting the SCR over 
concerns that Doncasters interests risked being marginalised. Discontent with the SCR model 
intensified with the perception that English city-regional devolution had stagnated as the UK 
government took their eye off the ball to prepare for and engage in Brexit negotiations with 
the EU (Civic Organisation C). In an effort to bolster support for the city-deal, a consortium of 
anchor institutions from across the city-region authored A Better Future Together (SCR Vision, 
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2017), a vision of the SCR premised on a high-skills and knowledge-intensive economy. 
However, the prospectus has been described elsewhere as the epitome of a consensual 
depoliticized call-to-arms vision for the She൶eld City Region that normalises neoliberalism by 
branding elected representation as partisanship that must be cast aside for the common 
good; smoothing away questions of distribution, inequality and poverty; and limiting resident 
involvement in the visioning process (Etherington and Jones, 2018: 61). Set within this strained 
context, Doncaster began to explore an alternative devolution arrangement in direct opposition 
to the dominant core-city model.  
In September 2017, Doncaster, with Barnsley, announced its intention to pursue Yorkshire-wide 
devolution alongside 16 other local authorities while Sheffield and Rotherham stood firm on 
securing the SCR deal. The formers intent was bolstered by the election of Dan Jarvis as SCR 
Mayor, who was sympathetic to Yorkshire-wide devolution. Beyond the SCR, support for a 
Yorkshire deal also intensified following an initial failed bid to establish the West Yorkshire 
Combined Authorityxiv, as well as the exclusion of Hull and the East Riding from the 
governments priority areas for devolution (Figure 1c).  
In order to strengthen their claim for Yorkshire devolution (Figure 1d), a period of case-making 
was embarked on by Doncaster and others to build momentum and develop a clear and 
convincing logic for a Yorkshire deal. First, in an attempt to add democratic legitimacy to their 
proposal, Doncaster and Barnsley conducted, in December 2017, community polls to gauge 
public opinion on the prospect of devolution at the scale of the SCR or Yorkshire. Of those that 
voted in Doncaster (20.1% of the electorate), 85.0% were in favour of Yorkshire-wide 
devolution, delivering what advocates insisted was a local mandate to challenge government and 
lobby for a Yorkshire deal. Then, in the summer of 2018, Steer Economic Development  an 
arm of Steer Consulting  was commissioned jointly by the 18 supporting local authorities to 
produce an economic assessment of the One Yorkshire geography.  The consultants argued 
that 
Yorkshire (and Humber) is a coherent and interconnected economic area [that] 
includes several functional economic areas, which have strong interconnections, and 
similar/shared issues, priorities and networks (Steer Economic Development, 2018: i).  
 As a product of this economic coherence, it was estimated that Yorkshire-wide devolution 
could add £31billion to Yorkshires economy (Steer Economic Development, 2018). The report 
was, in October 2018, submitted to the Secretary of State for consideration, with the emphasis 
falling on the added contribution of Yorkshire devolution to the national economy above that of 
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current arrangements that would enhance post-Brexit, Yorkshires international significance 
and trade profile beyond [established] European markets (Local Officer C). Here a number 
of interviewees championed the greater strategic opportunities (Local Officer C) offered to 
Doncaster through a Yorkshire-wide deal, where global ambitions were seen to rest on access to 
economic gateways beyond the SCR:  
There are so many opportunities on the East Coast [of Yorkshire]. We have a growing 
green energy offer, the Humber [and the port of Hull] has received multi-million pound 
investmentsand there are opportunities for us [Doncaster] to access global markets, 
especially China, through the East Coast ports (Local Officer E).  
What was notable here was how the established economic logics of city-regionalism  
agglomeration, (inter-)national competitiveness, and the assumption of bigger being better  
were keenly embraced by advocates promoting the virtues of a Yorkshire-wide deal. Alongside 
the political and economic arguments used to frame the One Yorkshire imaginary, interview 
testimonies also pointed to an aspiration to re-connect with the public and especially the so-
called left-behind, a narrative that featured prominently in the run-up to and aftermath of the 
EU referendum. In Doncaster specifically, working-class disillusionment  wrapped up in 
legacies of industrial nostalgia, precarization of labour and increased migration  are said to have 
fuelled the rise of English nationalism in the townxv alongside support for Brexit, where 69% of 
the local electorate voted in favour of Leave (Thorleifsson, 2016). However, for one interviewee, 
the city-regional model will be limited in addressing public disillusionment since  
by the very nature of what you call them [city-regions]; theyre going to exclude big 
chunks of the community, the public (Civic Organisation C). 
 For a number of advocates of One Yorkshire, the focus on reconnecting with the people was 
underpinned by a sense of historic regional identity and affiliation to Yorkshire that was 
described as a nation within a nation (Civic Organisation B). That the same historic identity 
was used to garner support for the former RDA, Yorkshire Forward (Figure 1d), is reflective of 
how the legacies of earlier attempts to construct spatial imaginaries live on in multiple ways 
through identity, meaning and memory that challenge currently hegemonic arrangements 
(Hincks et al., 2017: 13).   
Co- C  R  
In February 2019, the Yorkshire-wide devolution proposal was rejected by central government 
because it did not meet the required devolution criteria (Parsons, 2019). That no details were 
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given as to the criteria the proposal failed to meet underpinned the dismay that a number of 
interviewees conveyed about central governments approach to deal-making as one lacking 
prescription and riddled with mixed messages (Local Officer A)  only articulated through 
their staunch commitment to the SCR.  In an attempt to break the impasse, in March 2019 
Doncaster came together with the other SCRCA members to agree the SCR deal, which was 
signed-off by central government in May 2019. 
The negative perceptions of the deal-making process reflect a devolution agenda being rolled out 
across the UK, and especially England, where secret deals are brokered between political and 
business elites from a menu of policies approved by HM Treasury (Tomaney, 2016: 550). 
Here interviewees reflected on how central government had consistently closed down 
discussions of alternatives to the SCR on rational economic grounds and through the 
employment of technocratic, computer says no (Local Officer G) approaches to decision-
making. To this end, one interviewee presented the devolution process  formalised through the 
SCR deal  as something akin to a technocratic accountancy exercise that was   
not [about] genuine choice; its just a case of us administering the money were given, 
within the [strict] rules were set (Local Officer G). 
For others, political strategising was also at play reflecting reluctance on the part of a 
Conservative central government to support a unit of economic and political decision-making 
that was more than a sum of its city-regional parts, and which could potentially challenge 
hegemonic ideas about how local economic development is leveraged, as one interviewee 
claimed: 
a Yorkshire mayor who will probably be a Labour appointed mayorSo I imagine 
theyre [Conservative-led central government] not in a rush to support One Yorkshire 
(Chamber of Commerce A). 
Against this context, a number of interviewees on both sides of the SCR/One Yorkshire debate 
acknowledged that a lack of central government willingness to entertain alternatives to city-
regional models forced the adoption of pragmatic engagement with the SCR because  
as a local authority you are over a barrel to put it crudelyyou cant say were not 
playing because then youre not going to get anything (Local Officer A). 
 Against the backdrop of Brexit, where pragmatism was seen as a necessary response to 
uncertainty, advocates of both the SCR and Yorkshire-wide devolution models employed 
economic arguments to bolster their claims of the virtues of their respective models. For 
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supporters of the SCR, Brexit was often framed as a distraction, with advocates quick to dismiss 
the idea that Brexit could derail the city-regional agenda because inward investment didn't 
miss a beat [after Brexit]mainly because were playing to a global market, not an intensely 
European one (SCRCA Officer D). Yet on the other side of the debate, Brexit was seen as a 
potential interrupt moment (Chamber of Commerce B) that required pragmatic solutions 
but also represented an opportunity for local experimentationwithout interference from 
central government (Local Officer G). 
Across interviewee testimonies, the SCR and One Yorkshire imaginaries were both presented as 
sensible models of devolution, premised on variably complementary (e.g. the benefits of city-
regional/regional agglomeration) and competing (e.g. identity and belonging versus economic 
functionality) logics. These logics have themselves evolved alongside temporal framings of the 
SCR imaginary as one for the moment and One Yorkshire as one for tomorrow, as one 
interviewee notes: 
There is almost like an interim approach of supporting the Sheffield City Region 
devolution model with a view to moving towards the One Yorkshire agenda further 
down the line (Local Officer G). 
What emerges is a situation in which Yorkshire-wide devolution, despite being rejected by 
central government, remains stubbornly rooted in debates about devolution in South Yorkshire 
to such an extent that the SCR and Yorkshire-wide imaginaries are co-constituted, each 
supported through variously entwined discursive and material practices (see Jessop, 2012). As a 
functional economic geography, the SCR is often represented as the optimum scale for 
devolving powers while simultaneously being dismissed as an economic lightweight when 
compared to One Yorkshires scale of 5 million people (Chamber of Commerce B). In 
contrast, Yorkshire-wide devolution has been criticised for its claims to scale and not 
functionality and nostalgia not economic sense. Equally, supporters of the SCR pointed to the 
apparent reticence of those advocating Yorkshire-wide devolution to the challenges of making 
the arrangement inclusive and responsive to local needs given that Barnsley, Rotherham, 
Doncaster are very different to Harrogate and North Yorkshire (SCRLEP Officer A).  
Yet both imaginaries are presented as coherent economic geographies where devolution is 
projected to deliver significant economic dividends. That the veracity of such claims is highly 
contested is reflected in the counterclaims made by the detractors of the SCR and Yorkshire-wide 
models. For SCR advocates, the One Yorkshire imaginary serves as a distraction from what is 
the real focus of local policymaking, the SCR. By contrast, One Yorkshire supporters branded 
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opposition to Yorkshire-wide devolution as fear of the unknown, where competition and 
collaboration is externalised beyond the insular boundaries of the city-region. Yet there 
remained, on both sides of the debate, a sense that pragmatism and compromise  though not 
necessarily consensus  could be achieved by recognising the virtues of both imaginaries. A 
number of interviewees pointed to the limits of a binary conversation between doing a South 
Yorkshire deal or doing a Yorkshire deal (SCRCA Officer A) or the understanding of there 
being nothing exclusive to say you've joined one club and therefore you can't join other 
clubs (SCRCA Officer A). Across the spectrum, there are a variety of credibility claims being 
made about the benefits and drawbacks of the two imaginaries, underpinned by the work of 
powerful actors with vested interests in maintaining or reframing how and where to devolve 
powers and allocate resources (Hincks et al., 2017). Here, in a moment of apparent compromise, 
Whitehall stated on the signing of the SCR deal, that they welcomed the commitment to city-
regional devolution and agreed to the terms set out by the SCR that allowed constituent local 
authorities to break from the city-region in 2022 should they choose to continue pursuing 
Yorkshire-wide devolution. Given the current national political commitment to the SCR and the 
long-standing support for Yorkshire-wide devolution, it is clear that both imaginaries live on in 
competing and complementary ways. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper provides new conceptual and empirical insights in to the role city-regions play as part 
of a geopolitical strategy deployed by the nation state in response to ongoing territorial-political 
dilemmas (Jonas and Moisio, 2018: 366). Here we aligned Jonas and Moisios framework with 
work on the performative role of economic models and spatial-economic imaginaries in 
consolidating and legitimising region-building efforts (Haughton et al., 2016; Hincks et al., 2017). 
We emphasised how specific imaginaries gain credibility and traction through the claim-making 
of actors that involves justifying, lobbying and bolstering support for a dominant vision while 
working to limit the influence of alternatives (Haughton et al., 2013). Against this conceptual 
context, three overlapping phases were identified in the building of the SCR: a period of initial 
case-making to build momentum behind the imaginary; a second of concerted challenge from 
alternative imaginaries; and a third where the SCR and One Yorkshire imaginary can be seen to 
be co-constituted.  
Our work demonstrated how, in this first phase, the SCR imaginary was consolidated through 
various deals that aligned the interests of the SCR with those of the state in a context where city-
regions have come to constitute the only game in town (Beel et al., 2016). To build momentum 
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the SCR was held up as a functional economic geography that offered the potential to capture 
international capital and exploit a global brand. The projection of certainty and robustness in 
focusing on functional geographies was effective in building credibility around the SCR concept 
and the underpinning economic logics rooted in agglomeration and competitive (inter-)national 
growth. One of the interesting contradictions here was how the SCR deal was contingent on the 
SCRCA agreeing to elect a mayor who stood on a platform of mutualism and co-operative 
principles when the logic of competitiveness is seen typically to win-out. From our point of view, 
this apparent contradiction is reflective of the nature of situated economies (Polanyi, 1944) where 
spatial imaginaries are constituted through and positioned within dynamic and variegated hybrids 
of multiple modes of coordination of resources, power and interventions involving competition, 
exchange, redistribution and reciprocity (Haughton et al., 2016: 357). 
Yet that many interviewees saw the alignment of central and local interests as only convenient 
for the moment was testament to early discontent with central governments radical devolution 
approach, especially in the face of ongoing austerity measures. This discontent fuelled 
momentum behind the dominant alternative spatial imaginary based on devolution for the 
historic county of Yorkshire that challenged the SCR in the minds of early advocates and 
bolstered the claims of detractors that the SCR was not fit for purpose. The location of the SCR 
HS2 station was the focus of a major dispute that exposed antagonistic relations and the 
perseverance of local politics and diverging interests within the SCR. The lack of strategic 
maturity among actors engaged in the process was bemoaned while the governments labelling 
of the City of Sheffield as core was seen as problematic in marking out other places in the SCR 
as peripheral or other. Here the challenge to the SCR came from detractors of the big city 
model while the Brexit vote and the so-called left-behind were used to evidence claims that 
identity and attachment were being undermined by the SCR to the detriment of Yorkshire as a 
whole. Through the use of community polls and independent consultants, supporters of One 
Yorkshire aimed to build momentum behind the alternative imaginary and secure legitimacy 
from below. Interestingly, this claim-making also co-opted economic logics  agglomeration, 
(international) competitiveness and the assumption of bigger being better  typically employed 
by city-regional advocates, illustrating how spatial imaginaries can be co-constituted through 
their spatial as well as discursive orientations.  
It was against this context of the co-constitution of the two imaginaries that central government 
interests were seen to close down discussions of alternatives to the SCR through the mobilisation 
of technocratic mechanisms of governance. What emerged were clear indications of central 
governments initial unwillingness to entertain alternatives to the SCR, alongside credibility 
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building by local actors that forced the adoption of pragmatic engagement with the SCR. Yet 
interestingly, this did not manifest in meaningful consensus with both the SCR and One 
Yorkshire imaginaries held up in different coalitions as sensible models of devolution. That the 
Yorkshire-wide model remained stubbornly logged in debates about devolution in South 
Yorkshire is testament to the durability of spatial imaginaries, especially those rooted in identity, 
memory and historic attachment (Hincks et al., 2017).  
While the signing of the SCR deal and the governments agreement to allow local authorities to 
break away from the city-region in 2022 to continue pursuing Yorkshire devolution could 
suggest a moment of misalignment between local and national interests, we see this in a different 
way. Rather than constituting a climb-down by central government, we see the tactic as further 
illustration of city-regionalism being mobilised by the state to deliver national interests. First, the 
time between the signing of the deal and 2022 will provide a bedding in period for devolution in 
the SCR  that includes delivering on the commitments and funding allocations that were agreed. 
Second, there has been to date no firm public commitment from central government that 
Yorkshire-wide devolution will ever be on the negotiating table. Third, the terms of the 
agreement reached between pro-South Yorkshire and pro-Yorkshire-wide councils mean that 
Doncaster and Barnsley will only be permitted to split from the SCR if Sheffield and Rotherham 
are not set to lose like-for-like funding (Torr, 2019).  
In short, the city-regional imaginary has gained traction locally with national interests closing 
down pockets of local resistance to the SCR, establishing  at least in the short-term  a 
(singular) dominant order in space (Haughton et al., 2013: 222). Local resistance initially delayed 
the signing of the SCR deal but by displacing Yorkshire-wide devolution the government has, 
momentarily at least, locked South Yorkshire into its preferred model of devolution. In 
conceptual terms, while alternative spatial imaginaries, such as One Yorkshire, exist and often 
open-up discussions of different spatial futures, this does not necessarily guarantee scope for 
radical alternatives to emerge (Haughton et al., 2013). What we found is that even as history and 
identity featured prominently in the making of the One Yorkshire imaginary, claims to the 
credibility of this alternative imaginary were underpinned by a predominant focus on neoliberal 
economic case-making that did not disrupt but rather co-opted logics of agglomeration, 
competitiveness and market-led agendas.  
Yet central government also exposed city-region building as a precarious fix, one characterised 
by others as reflecting a spatially-articulated metagovernance failure, where different and 
multiple spatial frameworks appear to be operating at the same time and evoking a crisis of 
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crisis-management (Etherington and Jones, 2016: 387). In our view, it is this crisis of crisis-
management, expressed through the continued co-constitution of the SCR and Yorkshire-wide 
imaginaries, that provides advocates of One Yorkshire with scope to lobby and build credibility 
around the currently marginalised imaginary going forward. The building of a future One 
Yorkshire imaginary, capable of destabilising the SCR, could be bolstered by virtue of the 
simplification of the conditions of action, [that] so often lead to the revenge of problems that 
get ignored, marginalized, displaced, or deferred (Etherington and Jones, 2016: 385; Jessop, 
2011: 117). Here One Yorkshire may well have failed to dislodge the currently dominant city-
regional imaginary, but our work suggests that One Yorkshire is simply a deferred problem for 
central government. In short, watch this space. 
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i
 All nine constituent local authorities of the city-region recorded majorities in favour of leaving the EU during the 
Referendum of 2016. 
ii New labours post-1997 Devolution and Constitutional Change agenda included the creation of regional 
development agencies (RDA), indirectly elected regional chambers and the proposal to establish directly elected 
regional assemblies in the eight English regions with strategic powers over a range of areas including transport, 
health, culture and housing. RDAs and Regional Chambers were introduced but the proposal to establish directly 
elected regional assemblies was rejected by 78% of voters in a referendum held in North East England.  
iii The Northern Powerhouse has since been defined as the area covered by the 11 Northern Local Enterprise 
Partnerships (LEP) in England as well as North Wales (https://northernpowerhouse.gov.uk/about/). 
iv
 http://www.northernpowerhousepartnership.co.uk/our-priorities/. 
v HS2 is a high-speed rail link connecting London to Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds 
(https://www.hs2.org.uk/).  
vi
 http://www.ukpol.co.uk/greg-clark-2012-speech-on-city-deals/. 
vii In March 1984, the National Coal Board announced plans to cut national coal production by the equivalent of 20 
pits or 20,000 jobs, leading to the National Union of Mineworkers to call on miners to strike. With national 
government stockpiling coal and disrupting flying pickets (that included violent confrontation between police and 
the strikers, exemplified by the so-called Battle of Orgreave) 
(https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jun/15/thirty-five-years-on-orgreave-campaigners-still-seek-
answers), the strike had broken-down by March 1985 (https://www.sheffield.gov.uk/home/libraries-
archives/access-archives-local-studies-library/research-guides/miners-strike). 
viii
 Regional Development Agency (RDA) covering the Yorkshire region, 1999-2012. 
ix
 Between 2000 and 2002, 21 Doncaster Councillors were convicted of fraud for gaining financially from corrupt 
planning decisions or for submitting false expenses claims while in public office. Between 2010 and 2014, central 
government also intervened in Doncaster following an Audit Commission inspection that exposed major failing in 
its childrens services and concerns over the leadership capabilities of senior Council officials. 
x
 https://sheffieldcityregion.org.uk/mayor-champions-the-youth-voice/. 
xi
 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/hs2-and-the-northern-powerhouse. 
xii
 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/chancellor-hails-historic-deal-for-sheffield. 
xiii According to Cities Outlook 2019, Doncaster and the City of Sheffield recorded comparable levels of productivity, 
here in terms of GVA per worker (43,700 and 45,900 respectively) (Centre for Cities, 2019).    
xiv The WYCA was established in 2014 covering the 10 districts of the Leeds city-region (Barnsley, Bradford, 
Calderdale, Craven, Harrogate, Kirklees, Leeds, Selby, Wakefield and York). 
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xv In the 2015 General Election, support for the UK Independence Party (UKip) increased in Doncaster Central by 
20.7% compared to the 2010 General Election, resulting in UKip achieving the second highest vote share in the 
constituency (https://electionresults.parliament.uk/election/2015-05-
07/results/Location/Constituency/Doncaster%20Central). 
